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Abstract. Domain Name Service is a trusted protocol made for name
resolution, but during past years some approaches have been developed
to use it for data transfer. DNS Tunneling is a method where data is
encoded inside DNS queries, allowing information exchange through the
DNS. This characteristic is attractive to hackers who exploit DNS Tun-
neling method to establish bidirectional communication with machines
infected with malware with the objective of exfiltrating data or send-
ing instructions in an obfuscated way. To detect these threats fast and
accurately, the present work proposes a detection approach based on a
Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) with a minimal architecture com-
plexity. Due to the lack of quality datasets for evaluating DNS Tunneling
connections, we also present a detailed construction and description of
a novel dataset that contains DNS Tunneling domains generated with
five well-known DNS tools. Despite its simple architecture, the result-
ing CNN model correctly detected more than 92% of total Tunneling
domains with a false positive rate close to 0.8%.
Keywords: Neural Networks · Network Security · DNS Tunneling.
1 Introduction
The Domain Name System (DNS) is a well-established and trusted protocol. It
was originally made for name resolution and not for data transfer, so it is often
not seen as a malicious communications and data exfiltration threat and there-
fore, organizations rarely analyze DNS packets for malicious activity. This lack
of attention has made it attractive to attackers, who exploit the DNS protocol by
using a technique called DNS Tunneling. With this method, data is encoded
inside DNS queries and responses, allowing attackers to exchange information in
an obfuscated way.
A requirement to use DNS Tunneling is that the attacker must control a
domain and a DNS server, which receives the DNS requests for the domain and
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act as an authoritative server for that domain in order to run the server-side
tunneling and decoding programs. By doing so, the attacker can observe all
incoming DNS queries and have control under the answers to the queries.
Consider a machine that has been comprised, i.e. infected with malware. DNS
Tunneling can be used by the attacker in two ways [3]:
– to exfiltrate data from the compromised machine to an external server con-
trolled by the attacker.
– to establish a tunnel and send communications and instructions from the
external server to the compromised machine.
If the attacker registers the domain evilsite.com, then data from comprised
machine can be transmitted as a DNS request to
<base64 encoded data>.evilsite.com. Then the server controlled by the at-
tacker could send any command/data by responding to the query with a CNAME,
TXT or NULL record as response. Hence, the attacker can receive and send data,
i.e. a bidirectional data transfer channel is achieved using DNS tunneling. The
advantages of this method include that DNS is almost always accessible in the
network , no direct connection is established between the comprised machine
and attacker, and pure data exfiltration (upstream only) is difficult to detect.
Catching threats which exploit the DNS has become a central topic in net-
work security and various types of malicious domains detection methods have
been proposed. A common approach for detecting these DNS Threats are the
so-called lexicographical approaches. Under such approaches domains are clas-
sified by studying the statistical properties of the characters conforming the
domain name, such as the frequency distribution of properties, domain char-
acter length, Shannon entropy, the vowel/consonant ratio and dictionary-based
similarity among others [1, 3, 11].
Several other DNS Threats detection approaches extended the idea of using
the information provided by domain names properties to train a machine learning
classifier such as Support Vector Machine (SVM), Naive Bayes (NB), Decision
Tree (DT) [13] or Logistic Regression [3]. Recently, to avoid the need of designing
the right set of features for training machine learning classifiers, some authors
explored the application of Deep Learning (DL) techniques. In [16], an LSTM
network was presented as a Domain Generation Algorithms (DGA) classifier
reaching a 90% detection rate. With a similar focus, in [2] a DGA classifier was
built, but in this case based on a simple 1D Convolutional neural network (1D-
CNN) capable of detecting more than 97% of total DGA domains with a false
positive rate close to 0.7%.
As state in [6], research on DGA detection can be used for DNS Tunneling
detection since DGA generated domains are abnormal in a similar way to names
from data encoding, so it is reasonable to apply the same detection approach.
Following this idea, in the present work we focus on analyzing the DNS Tun-
neling detection performance of a 1D-CNN with an architecture similar to [2].
In addition and given the lack of quality datasets for evaluating DNS tunneling
connections, we create a new dataset from five well-known DNS tunneling tools.
The dataset was created on Virtual Machine infrastructure using a time injection
methodology [14] for executing and logging several DNS tunneling tools.
The main contributions of the present article are:
– A 1D convolutional neural network (1D-CNN) capable of detecting DNS
Tunneling in Domain names.
– The evaluation of the 1D-CNN model on a new generated dataset following
a well defined methodology for labeling tunneling connections.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the network
architecture, Section 3 explains the dataset construction, Section 4 illustrates the
experimental design while Section 5 details the results, and finally in Section 6,
we present the conclusions.
2 Deep Learning model Lexicographical Detection
The Neural Network Architecture model is a 1D Convolutional Neural Network
(CNN). This CNN is composed of three main layers. The first one is an Embed-
ding layer, then there is a Conv1D layer, and finally a Dense fully connected
layer. The first two layers are the most relevant components of the architecture
regarding the problem of detecting Tunneling domains. Both layers are respon-
sible for learning the feature representation in order to feed the third Dense and
fully connected layer. Beside the three layers previously described, the complete
Neural Network Architecture includes some other layers for dealing with the
dimensions output of the Conv1D layer as well as layers for representing the
input domain and the output probability. A detail of the complete architecture
together with the used activation functions is shown in Table 1, whereas the
three main layers are described in the following subsections.
Table 1: The complete network architecture including the corresponding
output dimensions and activation function used in each layer
Layer (type) Activation Function
input (Input Layer) -
embedding (Embedding) -
conv1d (Conv1D) relu
dense 1 (Dense) relu
dense 2 (Dense) sigmoid
2.1 Embedding Layer
A character embedding consists in projecting l-length sequences of input char-
acters into a sequence of vectors Rlxd, where l has to be determined from the
information provided by the sequences in the training set and d is a free parame-
ter indicating the dimension of the resulting matrix [16]. By using an Embedding
layer in the architecture, the neural network learns in an efficient manner the
optimal set of features that represent the input data.
2.2 1D Convolutional Layer
The Conv1D layer refers to a convolutional network layer over one dimension.
For the Tunneling detection problem, such dimension consists of the length of
the domain name sequence. The convolutional layer is composed of a set of
convolutional filters that are applied to different portions of the domain name.
A visual example of the feature extraction process for a 1D Conv layer is shown
in Fig. 1. The figure depicts a 1D convolutional layer constructing 256 filters
(features) (nf = 256), with a window (kernel) size of 4 (ks = 4) and a stride
length value of 1 (sl = 1). The layer selects from groups (also referred as patches)
of 4 characters to apply the convolutional filters, and continues shifting one
character at a time (stride value) applying the same convolutions filter over
the rest of the sequence. Consequently, the neural network generates 4-grams
features. These features represent the discriminative power of these group of
letters in the domain names.
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Fig. 1: Feature extraction process of the 1D convolutional layer
By applying the same filter all over the sequence the required computation
time is considerable reduced when compared with traditional Multilayer Percep-
tron layers. Additionally, since a convolutional kernel independently operates on
each 4-gram it is possible to go over the entire input layer concurrently. This par-
alellization and its consequent low computing time is one of the major benefits of
using convolutional networks instead of other deep learning approaches usually
used for text processing such as Long Short Term Memory (LSTM) [7,15,16].
2.3 Dense Layers
The features extracted by both previous layers are be used by traditional Mul-
tilayer Perceptron Network (MLP) to output the probability of a given domain
belongs to Tunneling or Normal class. MLP is composed of two layers: A first
fully connected layer of size hn (Dense layer ) connected to a second Dense layer
of size 1 used for actually giving the probability output about the considered
domain.
3 Dataset
3.1 A Methodology for Collecting Tunneling DNS Data
A Virtual Machine Infrastructure (VMI) including all the required components
for performing a DNS tunneling connection was deployed in order to proceed
with the acquisition of DNS tunneling data. In the diagram from Fig. 2 it is
possible to recognize the three main components involved in DNS tunneling:
(a) the clients, which are a group a (possible) compromised machines inside
the local network, (b) a local DNS server in charge of logging and resolving
all local clients DNS requests. and (c) a computer outside the local network
where DNS tunneling server side is running. In addition, two domain names were
registered in order to provide authoritative answers: harpozedcompute.com and
securitytesting.online. Both domains were properly configured for pointing
to computer running the DNS tunneling servers.
DNS Tunneling Clients
D
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DNS Tunneling Server 
DNS query to 
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Passive DNS 
logger
DNS <encoded> 
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Fig. 2: Virtual Machine infrastructure (VMI) for acquiring DNS tunneling
data
The use of VMI facilitates the execution of different DNS tunneling tools
under a controlled environment. In this work, five different DNS tunneling tools
were executed inside the VMI. The name along with a summary description of
each DNS tools is shown in Table 2. Four out the five tools are oriented to high
throughput connections. The only exception is the DNSexfiltrator tool which
performs sporadic data exchanges using DNS. Certainly, the detection of such
low throughput data exchanges results in a considerable more difficult task.
Table 2: DNS tunneling tools executed inside the VMI
Tool Description Throughput
tuns IpV4 over DNS tunneling High
dnscat2 C&C oriented DNS tunneling High
dns2tcp TCP over DNS tunneling High
iodine IpV4 over DNS tunneling High
DNSexfiltrator simple data exchange over DNS Low
A set of Unix shell scripts were implemented for automatizing different com-
mon actions performed through the tunnel. In the case of the high throughput
tools, the script consisted of a number of ICMP ECHO REQUEST packets and
the transfer of files of different sizes. In the case of DNSExfiltrator, only the
transfer were implemented.
A simple approach for collecting all the tunneling conections inside the recur-
sive DNS logs consists of searching for all requests coming from harpozedcomput.com
and securitytesting.online. In addition, for precisely recognizing the re-
quest corresponding to each tool, a time injection strategy [14] was used. Under
such strategy, the script execution timestamp is recorded for further timestamp
matching with the recursive DNS server logs in the VMI.
Finally, since both tuns and dns2tcp failed at establishing the tunnel con-
nections, neither file transfer nor ICMP packet were transmitted. However, the
repeated failed attempts were still logged.
3.2 Dataset Description
The dataset used in this paper contains both DNS Tunneling and normal domain
names.The resulting distribution for both classes can be observed in Table 3.
For DNS Tunneling, 8000 tunnel domains were generated as explained in
Section 3.1. Three tunneling tools were discriminated,dnscat2 [4], iodine [8] and
DNSExfiltrator [5]. Several DNS requests coming from unspecified tunneling
tools, as well as failed attempts to establish the tunneling connection, are refered
as Not Specified in the table.
In order to balance the dataset for both domains classes (i.e. DNS Tunneling
and normal), we collected 8000 normal domains that come from the Alexa top
one million domains and the Bambenek Consulting feed. Finally, a small portion
of the dataset contain commonly accessed domains inside Czech Republic domain
Table 3: DNS tunneling tools executed inside the VMI
Class Source Total
Tunneling dnscat2 23
DNSexfiltrator 78
iodine 346
Not specified 7553
cz 511
Normal bambenek 3000
alexa 5000
name servers. The Czech language is particularly difficult to detect given its low
vocal/consonant ratio.
The complete dataset detailed in this section was split into two new datasets:
the first one, containing 80% of total entries, is used for the training and tuning
of the network. The second one, containing the remaining 20% of total entries, is
used for the evaluation of the proposed model on unseen domains. Both training
and testing datasets can be found in [10].
4 Experiment Design
In this section, we describe the selected metrics and the hyper-parameters fine-
tuning methodology for improving the model results.
4.1 Metrics
Several standard metrics are used for evaluating the network. These metrics are
Precision, Recall or True Positive Rate (TPR), False Positive Rate (FPR)
and F1-Score. Precision is computed as the ratio of items correctly identified
as positive out of total items identified as positive while Recall is computed as
the ratio of items correctly identified as positive out of total true positives. The
F1-Score is the harmonic mean of Precision and Recall. Finally, False Positive
Rate is computed as the ratio between items incorrectly identified as positive
and the total number of actual negative predictions.
4.2 Hyper Parameters Tuning
The proposed model possesses many hyper-parameters that need to be tuned. In
order to complete the fine tuning task, a traditional Grid Search was conducted.
Among all the possible hyperparameters, we particularly focused on finding the
optimal values related to the Embedding, Conv1D and Dense layers. For a robust
estimation, the evaluation of each parameter combination was carried out using
a k-fold cross validation with k = 5 folds. The 1D-CNN was trained using the
back propagation algorithm [12] considering the Adaptive Moment Estimation
optimizer [9]. The 1D-CNN training was carried out during 10 epochs. Table 4
shows the parameter combinations with the best performance detection in terms
of the F1-Score.
Table 4: Best Hyper-parameters subset. For space reason only the higher
average F1-Score parameter combination is shown. This combination was
chosen for all the remaining experiments.
avg. F1 sd nf ks sl d l hn parameters
0.936820 0.011219 1024 4 1 100 45 256 11,425,685
5 Results
The hyper-parameters selected in the previous section were employed for training
the network. Then, the model was tested using the explained testing dataset.
The experiment results are shown in Table 5 where metrics illustrated in Section
4.1 are calculated with a decision boundary threshold set to 0.90. The support
(size of test set) is given in the last column.
The resulting F1-Score around 96% and the low FPR achieved for the two
considered classes (i.e Normal and DNS Tunneling), demonstrate that the 1D-
CNN detection method was capable of extracting common patterns that are
important to discriminating malicious domains (DNS Tunneling) from non-
malicious domains.
Table 5: Resulting metrics of the proposed model evaluation on unseen
domains
Domain Type Precision Recall (TPR) FPR F1-Score Support
Normal 0.9342 0.9948 0.0762 0.9635 1726
Tunneling 0.9939 0.9237 0.0052 0.9575 1586
In Figure 3 we show the probability of being Tunneling given by the network
to each domain in testing set. Dots located on the left correspond to the true
Normal domains and dots located on the right are the true Tunneling domains.
The decision boundary threshold of 0.90 is plotted as a red line which indicates
that all dots above this line are classified as Tunneling domains whereas dots
below are classified as Normal domains.
When Tunneling domains are discriminated by the tunneling tool used to gen-
erated them, it can be seen that we were able to identify all Tunneling domains
Fig. 3: Tunneling probability explicit for each domain in testing set. Dots
corresponding to DNS Tunneling class have been colorized according to their
tunneling tool
generated with dnscat2 (violet dots), while in the case of DNSExfiltrator (red
dots) and iodine (green dots), we detected correctly 85% and 87% of these Tun-
neling domains respectively. There is a group of domains (orange dots) that, as
explained in Section 3, failed at establishing the tunnel connection, so they don’t
have a tunneling tool specified. We detected correctly 96% of these domains, be-
ing these results consistent with the overall performance of the network.
6 Concluding Remarks
In the present work, we explored the viability of 1D-CNN for lexicographical
DNS Tunneling detection.
A new dataset containing 8000 DNS requests was specially created for evalu-
ating the proposed model on domains generated with 5 common tunneling tools
as well as normal domains.
The dataset was properly split into training and testing sets. A hyper-parameters
grid search was conducted on training set and the best resulting model was then
evaluated on the testing set.
The resulting 1D-CNN was able to detect 99% of total normal domains and
92% of total Tunneling domains, with a FPR of 0.07% and 0.005% respectively.
Although its simple architecture, such results make it suitable for real-life net-
works.
Inspecting the Tunneling tool that were used to generate each malicious do-
main, we observed that we were able to identify all domains generated with
dnscat2 and around 86% for DNSExfiltrator and iodine. An analysis of the
lexicographical similarities and differences between domains generated with these
tools is left for future work. Moreover, since both tuns and dns2tcp failed at
establishing the tunnel connections, domains considered for the analysis of de-
tection rate discriminated by tunneling tool correspond to only 3 different tools.
Therefore, it could be necessary an in-depth analysis of how including more
tunneling tools affects the performance of the network.
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